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JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN SUITS
FOR WHICH CLASS ACTION STATUS IS
SOUGHT UNDER RULE 23(b)(3)
MILDRED B. BELL*
When the federal court's diversity jurisdiction has been
properly invoked by the named plaintiff in a suit which
subsequently is accorded class action status under Rule
23(b)(3), the representative claims are within the federal
court's primary subject matter jurisdiction and it is neither
necessary nor desirable to enlarge the ancillary jurisdiction
to accommodate such claims.
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court held in Snyder v.
Harris' that separate and distinct claims presented by and for var-
ious claimants in a class action may not be added together to satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirement of the diversity statute.2 The
decision precipitated an avalanche of unfavorable comment which
has not yet abated:'-criticism based largely upon the view that
* Assistant Professor of Law, Mercer University. The author wishes to express her
appreciation to Russell Hamilton for his assistance in researching this problem.
1. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
2. First enacted as Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 78, requiring that
the amount in controversy exceed $500 in order for the federal courts to have original jurisdic-
tion over suits between parties of diverse citizenship, in its present form the diversity statute
provides in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;
and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens
or subjects thereof are additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
3. E.g., C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 73 at 315-16 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as WRImrrl; Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to the Class Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 497 (1969); Starrs, Consumer Class Action-Part I: Considerations of
Procedures, 49 B.U.L. REV. 407 (1969); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7,
202-12 ( I9 (i); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class Action Device and
Its Utilization, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 631 (1970). But see Comment, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims to Meet the Jurisdictional Amount, 22 U. FLA. L.
REV. 154 (1969); 17 LOYOLA L. REV. 187 (1970-71).
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application of the nonaggregation doctrine to lawsuits for which
class action status has been sought because numerous similar
claims contain common questions of law or fact, imposes an unnec-
essary jurisdictional requirement upon those claims4 and therefore
frustrates the purposes of the liberal class action procedures pro-
vided by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as amended
in 1966.
4. See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2d Cir. 1972) (Tim-
bers, J., dissenting); 41 CINCINNATI L. REV. 968 (1972); authorities cited note 3 supra.
5. In its note to the amended rules, the Advisory Committee indicated that the purpose
of the 1966 revision of Rule 23 was not only to eliminate the unwieldy classifications used in
the pre-1966 rule but also to provide a procedure for litigating many small, separate-but-
similar claims in a single lawsuit. Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Advisory Notel. This is not to say, however, that the committee contemplated that
the revision would make it possible to litigate in federal court separate claims which formerly
could not have been maintained because they could not satisfy a statutory amount in contro-
versy requirement. Rather, it would appear that the small claims referred to were those which
could have been litigated in federal court but which, because of the time, expense and
inconvenience involved, might not be enforced at all in the absence of a device for doing so
without either filing a separate lawsuit or intervening in a pre-1966 spurious class action. But
see The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 206 (1969) ("denying aggregation of
claims or liabilities to reach the jurisdictional amount nullifies the utility of the federal class
action" in cases where the individual claims are small.)
6. Rule 23, as amended in 1966, provides in pertinent part:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition . . . the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In addition, the rule provides that
Itihe judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to
whom the not ice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not
requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(3).
Taken together, these provisions provide the procedural mechanism for making judg-
ments rendered in class actions maintained as such because the separate and distinct claims
of the class members contain common ni tionq ,f 1 w - fact which pr-d6mnate c'cr
individual questions, conclusive even upon absent class members. Although it has been
suggested that the rule makes such judgments binding on absent class members, e.g., Zahn
v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 130 (D. Vt. 1971); Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation
of Claims for Achievement of Jurisdictional Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 601 (1968-
69), this clearly is an overstatement. As was recognized by the Advisory Committee, the rules
cannot and should not attempt to determine the res judicata effect of judgments entered
pursuant to the rules; this will have to be determined if and when the res judicata question
is raised in a subsequent action. Advisory Note, supra note 5. Nevertheless, the rule does
make it procedurally possible for the judgment to include class members. See Frankel, Some
Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39 (1967).
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In addition to the unfavorable comment which it has evoked,
the nonaggregation doctrine as applied in Snyder-where the
named plaintiff's claim was for less than $10,000 and nonaggrega-
tion therefore required dismissal of the complaint 7-has been inter-
preted in at least one case, Zahn v. International Paper Co.," to
mean that a lawsuit over which a federal court has diversity juris-
diction may not be maintained as a class action if any unnamed
class member would be unable to meet the jurisdictional amount
requirement. In that case the named plaintiffs were owners of prop-
erty fronting on Lake Orwell, Vermont, who brought suit on behalf
of themselves and other lakefront property owners to recover dam-
ages allegedly sustained as a result of defendant's pollution of the
lake. Each of the named plaintiffs met both the citizenship and
jurisdictional amount requirements of the diversity statute, but it
appeared that the claims of many of the potential class members
necessarily would be for less than $10,000. The district court, find-
ing that it would not be feasible to describe a class which would
exclude these latter potential claimants, ruled that the suit could
not proceed as a class action.
The Zahn decision apparently rested on the conclusion that
even when a district court clearly has jurisdiction over the named
plaintiff's claim, it has jurisdiction over the class action aspects of
the suit, under Snyder, only if each claim included therein is in
7. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). The Snyder case arose when one of some 4000
shareholders of an insurance company's common stock brought suit against the company's
board of directors to recover a portion of the proceeds the directors had received from sale of
their own stock. Plaintiff contended that the money which the directors received in excess of
the fair market value of the stock represented a payment to obtain control of the company
and was required by state law to be distributed among all shareholders. Although plaintiff
claimed only $8,740 in damages for herself, she filed the suit as a class action and contended
that the claims of all shareholders could be aggregated for purposes of determining the
amount in controversy. The district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit both rejected plaintiff's contention, holding that the claims were separate and
independent and that they therefore could not be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement. On certiorari, the Snyder case was consolidated with a similar case from
the Tenth Circuit, (as Service Companv v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), in which
both the district court and the court of appeals had aggregated separate claims of unnamed
class members with the named plaintiff's individual claim in order to determine the amount
in coitroversy. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision
refusing aggregation in Snyder and reversed the Tenth Circuit's contrary decision in Coburn.
8. 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 42 U.S.L.W.
4087 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973). See also Dierks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453, 456 (1st Cir. 1969).
But see Lonnquist v. J.C. Penny Co., 421 F.2d 597, 599-600 (10th Cir. 1970); Potrero Com-
munitv Action Comm. v. Housing Authority, 410 F.2d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1969).
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excess of $10,000. Implicit in the decision is a well-founded determi-
nation that ancillary jurisdiction does not extend to separate and
independent claims which are related to plaintiff's claim only in
that they contain common questions of law predominating over in-
dividual questions!' [hereinafter referred to simply as separate, or
separate and independent, claims],"' for if such claims were within
the court's ancillary jurisdiction they would not need to meet the
jurisdictional amount requirement in order for the suit to proceed
as a class action." Nevertheless, the case appears to have been
incorrectly decided. The conclusion that the suit could not proceed
as a class action does not necessarily follow from the determination
that the court does not have ancillary jurisdiction over complaints
of unnamed class members, even when coupled with a determina-
tion that some of the unnamed class members could not have in-
voked the federal court's primary jurisdiction for adjudication of
their own claims.
The Zahn court's conclusion that it did not have ancillary juris-
diction over separate claims of unnamed class members is in con-
formity with established jurisdictional principles. Until recently, it
was generally conceded that the mere existence of common ques-
tions of law or fact, among claims which have an independent juris-
dictional basis and others which do not, does not bring claims of the
latter type within the court's ancillary jurisdiction. No matter how
similar such claims were to claims properly before the court, it was
the prevailing view that they could not be adjudicated by the federal
court. 2 Prior to the 1966 amendment of the class action rule there
9. See authorities cited note 12 infra.
10. Since this paper is concerned only with separate claims whose sole relationship is
the existence of common questions which predominate over individual issues, for brevity's
sake claims of this type will hereafter be referred to simply as separate claims and this term
should be understood to indicate separate claims of the foregoing type.
i xsr ......a.. Is., ... ni,t ... upu atote 3, .s
12. H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 937-38
(1953) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLERi; Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. C. L. REv. 684, 704 (1940-41). But see Amen v. Black, 234
F.2d 12 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 888 (1956), dismissed per stipulation, 355 U.S.
600 (1958); Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Prelimi-
nary Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 575-76 (1937) (permissive intervention by class member requires
no independent jurisdictional basis).
Professors Hart and Wechsler had this to say with respect to Professor Moore's assertion
that permissive intervention in a "spurious" class action did not require independent jurisdic-
tional grounds: "Professor Moore's principal authority for [thisl view is the Shipley case
[Vol. 8
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was no procedural mechanism for making the judgments in class
actions involving such claims applicable to separate claims which
had not actually been presented by way of intervention prior to
entry of final judgment in the class action proceedings. 3 In other
words, the judgment affected only the claims of original parties and
those who became parties by way of intervention." The rule pro-
vided the procedure for intervention by those claimants who could
meet the requirements for permissive intervention 5 and who wished
to do so, but it did not purport to affect those who could not meet
the jurisdictional requirement for intervention-that is, those
claims which could not have been litigated in the federal court if
brought as separate actions.' 8
After Rule 23 was amended in 1966 to eliminate the interven-
tion requirement, however, it was widely assumed that the effect of
that procedural change was to remove the jurisdictional require-
ment. 7 Because the amended rule provided the procedural means
by which a class action judgment may "include and describe" un-
named claimants whose separate and independent claims are re-
lated to the main claim only in that they contain common ques-
[Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R., 70 F. Supp. 870, 876 (W.D. Pa. 1947)]. The only authority
cited in the Shipley case was Professor Moore." The authors then posed the question, "Is the
Supreme Court likely to uphold this use of Rule 23(a)(3) to accomplish so bald an enlarge-
ment of federal jurisdiction?" HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 937; see Kaplan & Rosen-
field, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684, 704 (1940-41).
13. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.30 at 23-502 (2d ed. 1969); 7 C. WmRGHr & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1753 at 539-40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WIGHT
& MILER]; Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 99.
14. See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7, 208 n.31 and authorities
cited therein; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13.
15. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 208 n.31 and authorities
cited therein; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 937-38; WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 21, 331;
Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684,
704 n.66 (1941); But see WIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, at 552-53.
16. See Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164 F.2d 387, 388 (2d Cir. 1947) cert. denied, 333
U.S. 843 (1948); Wagner v. Kemper, 13 F.R.D. 128, 130 (W.D. Mo. 1952); HAST & WECHSLER,
supra note 9, at 937-38; WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 21, 331; Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contem-
porary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REV. 684, 704 n.66 (1941). But see WmGT &
MILLER, supra note 13, at 552-53.
17. See, e.g., Gas Services Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nom.
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for
Achievement of Jurisdictional Amount, B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 601 (1968-69); Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 399-400 (1967). See also Cohn, The New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1219-22 (1966).
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tions," it appeared to many courts and commentators alike that
such claims were brought within the federal courts' ancillary juris-
diction and therefore no longer need have an independent basis of
jurisdiction."' In some instances this line of reasoning was carried
even further to permit a plaintiff who could not meet the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement to proceed in federal court merely be-
cause he had joined with other plaintiffs whose claims satisfied the
minimum amount in controversy requirement, ' or to permit aggre-
gation of the value of the so-called ancillary claim with that of the
named plaintiff's claim to meet the minimum amount in contro-
versy requirement which was necessary to invoke the court's diver-
sity jurisdiction in the first instance." It was the rejection of these
views that gave rise to such an unfavorable reaction to the Snyder
Court's determination that the nonaggregation doctrine is applica-
ble to class actions just as it is to other types of lawsuits. It appeared
to many critics that the liberalized class action procedure would be
deprived of much of its efficacy if individual claims in diversity class
actions were required to meet federal court jurisdictional require-
ments,22 and it was to eliminate this apparent difficulty that some
commentators suggested that ancillary jurisdiction should be ex-
panded to include separate claims containing common questions of
law or fact which predominate over individual issues. :
18. See note 5 supra.
19. E.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co.. 469 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers,
,1., dissenting); Lesch v. Chicago & Eastern 111. R.R., 279 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. 111. 1968); 73
COLUM. L. REv. 359 (1973); 61 GEO. L.J. 1327 (1933).
20. Lesch v. Chicago & Eastern Ill. R.R., 279 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Lucas
v. Seagrave Corp.. 277 F. Supp. 338, :147 (D. Minn. 1967). Contra, Ciaramitaro v. Woods,
324 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (E.D. Mich. 1971). See also Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415
F.2d 809. 816 (8th Cir. 1969); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Jacobson v. Atlantic
City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1968); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364
F.2d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 1966).
21. Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nor. Snvder v.
Harris, 384 U.S. 332 (1969).
Acceptance of this line of reasoning would require the development of an entirely new
concept of ancillary jurisdiction. In its previously accepted form, ancillary jurisdiction exists
only because of the close relationship between a claim over which the court already has
jurisdiction and one which is not otherwise within the court's jurisdiction. See notes 64-73
infra and accompanying text. It. would appear that until there is a claim which meets the
statutory requirement itself, there is no claim within the primary jurisdiction and therefore
closely related claims could not be within the court's ancillary jurisdiction either.
22. E.g . auhliorities cited-note 3 supra.
23. E.g., Zahn v. International Faper to., ,mi r./u i,.,, tzu ir. ill'Z) ( lImters, J.,
dissenting); Lesch v. Chicago & Eastern Ill. R.R., 279 F. Supp 908 (N.D. I11. 1968); 22 CLEVL.
[Vol. 8
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Although it is the thesis of this article that the federal courts'
ancillary jurisdiction should not be broadened to include separate
and independent claims whose only connection with the main claim
is the existence of common questions of law or fact, it does not
necessarily follow that the class action procedure cannot be used in
diversity actions even when the claims of the unnamed class mem-
bers are separate and independent ones which standing alone would
not be within the court's jurisidction. Expansion of the ancillary
jurisdiction to bring such claims within it would be both unwise and
unnecessary2"-unwise because, as will be shown below, the ancil-
lary jurisdiction can be expanded in this manner only if the consti-
tutional case or controversy requirement is so broadly interpreted
as to become virtually meaningless as a limitation on the federal
judicial power 2 -unnecessary because in representative suits other
than class actions, the existence vel non of diversity jurisdiction
historically has turned upon whether the representative himself can
invoke the court's jurisdiction, without regard to whether those
whom he represents could have done so. 2' There appears to be no
sound reason for according class actions different treatment in this
respect. 27 Therefore, if the named plaintiff has properly invoked the
federal court's diversity jurisdiction for the adjudication of his own
claims, and if the court subsequently determines that the named
L. REV. 204 (1973); 26 VAND. L. REV. 375 (1973).
24. Expanding the ancillary jurisdiction to further the purposes ofa procedural rule also
would be improper-not only because control of federal court jurisdiction is a legislative
function which was not delegated by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), but
also because, as the Snyder Court pointed out, the rules themselves provide that they "shall
not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts," FED.
R. Civ. P. 82, and judicial expansion of the jurisdiction to further the purposes of the class
action rule would permit the rules to affect the jurisdiction of the district courts indirectly if
nut directly. Sce 394 U.S. at 3:38. But see The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV.
7, 204 (1969) (While the rules cannot compel a particular interpretation of a jurisdictional
statute, "the Court must interpret jurisdictional requirements in the new procedural context
established by the rule.").
25. See notes 38-40, 74 infra and accompanying text.
26. Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 1971); General Research, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Employers' Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 735, 736 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Lesch v. Chicago &
Eastern Ill. R.R., 279 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Ili. 1968); see WRIGHT. supra note 3, § 29, at
95 (2d ed. 1970).
27. Professor Wright has suggested that class actions have not been treated differently
with respect to the diversity of citizenship requirement, WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 29, but the
present controversy over whether the claims of unnamed class members are within the courts'
ancillary jurisdiction suggests that class suits have not been viewed as representative suits
in all respects. If they had been, the question of ancillary jurisdiction would never have arisen.
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plaintiff is a proper representative of "others similarly situated"
and permits the suit to proceed as a class action, there should be
no problem with respect to subject matter jurisdiction over the rep-
resentative claims 2"-not because those claims are within the court's
ancillary jurisdiction but, rather, because they are within the
court's primary subject matter jurisdiction. Since diversity jurisdic-
tion exists over the plaintiff's own claim, it necessarily will exist
over any other claim which that plaintiff properly asserts against
the same defendant, whether as a representative or otherwise."
The distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and per-
sonal jurisdiction has not always been finely drawn by those who
criticize the Snyder decision, :"' and this may explain at least some
of the adverse reaction elicited by the Court's refusal to reinterpret
the jurisdictional statutes to further the procedural reform contem-
plated by the amendment to Rule 23. 31 But there are many critics
who, without blurring the distinction between subject matter and
personal jurisdiction, have simply taken the view that restrictions
on the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction must be relaxed
when necessary to effectuate an important procedural reform .32 The
weakness of this position becomes evident, however, when one con-
siders the true nature of subject matter jurisdiction.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In general
It is well settled that the federal courts are courts of limited
28. Since the determination that plaintiff is a proper representative is a judicial one, it
could not seriously be contended that federal jurisdiction over the class claims had been
obtained collusively or improperly within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1359 which provides
that
lal district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by
assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusivelv made or joined to invoke
the jurisdiction of such court.
29. See notes 57-59 infra and accompanying text.
30. See note 51 infra.
31. The provision in Rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the rules "shall
not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts,"
applies only to subject matter jurisdiction. Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
445 (1946). Therefore, if the aggregation problem is viewed as a personal jurisdiction problem,
or if the personal and subject matter distinctions are blurred when analyzing the problem,
the mandate of Rule 82 might be considered to be inapplicable.
32. E.g., The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 204-05 (1969).
[Vol. 8
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jurisdiction :  and that any plaintiff who invokes the federal judicial
power must affirmatively allege sufficient facts to overcome a pre-
sumption that the federal court does not have subject matter juris-
diction over his lawsuit." Article III of the Constitution sets the
limits within which the federal courts may be given jurisdiction, :'
but until Congress actually gives the courts jurisdiction over mat-
ters of a particular type they do not have the power to entertain such
matters. " Every federal court plaintiff therefore must be able to
point to a jurisdictional statute which gives the court power to en-
tertain his lawsuit, and the statute itself must be within the juris-
dictional boundaries set by Article III.37
Since Article III authorizes extension of the federal judicial
power only to "cases" or "controversies" which fit into one of the
nine categories enumerated therein, 31 the first requirement that
must be met by any claim for which federal adjudication is sought
is that it be presented in the context of a case or controversy within
the meaning of those terms as used in the Constitution. 31 It follows,
then, that any claim which itself is not within one of the Article III
subject matter categories must be so related to a claim which does
meet that requirement that the two claims together constitute a
33. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 21 (Wright ed.
1960); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.1 (1965); WRIGHT, supra note 3, §§ 7, 8.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178,
182 (1935); Turner v. President, Directors & Company of the Bank of North America, 4 U.S.
(4 DalI.) 8, 11 (1799); Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 382,383 (1798); 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 0.4111 (2d ed. 1972).
35. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803).
36. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 762 (1824).
37. E.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809); Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850); 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 21 (Wright ed. 1960).
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides that the federal judicial power shall extend:
III to all cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties . . . [2] to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consults;-[3] to all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-141 to contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a party;-[5 to Controversies between
two or more States;-[6 between a State and Citizens of another State;-171
between Citizens of different States;-181 between Citizens of the same State claim-
ing Lands under Grants of different States, and [91 between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
39. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937); Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
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single case or controversy for jurisdictional purposes." Only in these
circumstances can a claim of a type not provided for by Article III
be adjudicated in federal court.
Congress has enacted statutes which give the federal courts
jurisdiction over at least some cases within each of the nine catego-
ries"l enumerated in Article III. Section 1331 of the Judicial Code,
for example, gives the district courts original jurisdiction over those
cases arising under federal law in which the amount in controversy
exceeds $10,000,42 while section 1332 confers original jurisdiction
over those diversity of citizenship cases in which the amount in
controversy exceeds $10,000.1: In enacting the general federal ques-
tion statute Congress did not give the federal courts the power to
hear all cases arising under federal law, as it could have done under
the Constitution; it imposed a minimum amount-in-controversy
requirement which also must be met before the federal court has the
power to hear such cases. Similarly, Congress has not given the
federal courts the power to hear all cases in which individuals of
diverse citizenship are adversaries. While the Constitution requires
only that there be at least one plaintiff and one defendant of diverse
citizenship," the diversity statute requires that diversity of citzen-
ship exist between each plaintiff and each defendant,4" so that there
are no adverse parties of the same citizenship. In addition, unless
the claims of the several plaintiffs arise out of a single right in which
they have an undivided interest, the statute requires that the claims
of each plaintiff have a value in excess of $10,000.46 Thus, while
neither complete diversity nor a minimum amount in controversy
is required by the Constitution, both are required by the diversity
statute and claims of plaintiffs who cannot meet these requirements
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.47
40. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hurn v. Ousler, 289 U.S.
2365, 245 (1933).
41. See note 37 supra.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
44. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
45. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
46. Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 (1916); Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222
U.S. 39, 40 (1911).
47. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); City of Inglewood v. City of Los
Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972); Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
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While any court unquestionably must have jurisdiction over
both the subject matter of a suit and the parties to that suit before
it can adjudicate the claims presented therein, if subject matter
prerequisites are satisfied the fact that the court is unable to acquire
personal jurisdiction over one or more parties does not deprive the
court of subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, if the federal court
has diversity jurisdiction over a named plaintiffs claim, and if the
court subsequently permits that plaintiff to serve as the representa-
tive of others similarly situated for purposes of litigating common
issues, 1 the fact that the court could not have acquired personal
jurisdiction over some of the unnamed represented persons may be
relevant to the question of whether those individuals are bound by
any final judgment entered in the suit,4" but it is not relevant to the
question of whether the subject matter of the suit is cognizable in
federal court." Diversity jurisdiction exists by virtue of the diverse
nature of the citizenship of those who are asserting claims and de-
fenses5 ' rather than by virtue of the nature of the claims and defen-
ses themselves. When it exists, however, it gives the district court
jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the suit, just as do other
jurisdictional statutes. Whether the court has jurisdiction over par-
ticular individuals is quite another question)2
48. See note 27 supra.
49. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 1757.
50. Id.
51. When a lawsuit is brought by a representative, it is that representative-not the
represented individual-who asserts the claim, and it is the representative's citizenship that
is important for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See also notes 25 & 26 supra and accompa-
nying text.
52. Examples of confusion between personal and subject matter jurisdiction are numer-
ous. In Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), for example, where the
district court was faced with the problem of determining whether each individual claim must
meet the jurisdictional amount requirement in order for the suit to proceed as a class action,
the district court stated that "[Wle must initially determine whether there is jurisdiction
over all the members of the proposed class." 53 F.R.D. at 430. The court then went on to
state that
Itihe question is whether federal courts have jurisdiction over all members of an
allegedly otherwise proper class, in a class suit in which the claims of the class
members are separate and distinct, if some members of the class individually meet
the jurisdictional requirement as to the amount in controversy and others, who are
not named representatives, do not.
53 F.R.D. at 431 (emphasis added). The court thus appeared to be focusing on the class
members themselves rather than on their claims.
The mere fact that diversity jurisdiction exists only because of the diverse citizenship of
the adverse parties must not be allowed to obscure the fact that it is still the claim over which
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Multiple-Claim Suits
The foregoing principles present few problems when applied to
a complaint filed by a single plaintiff stating a single claim against
one or more defendants, but the situation becomes more compli-
cated when a complaint sets forth multiple claims, some of which
have an independent jurisdictional basis and some of which do not.
Do the multiple claims necessarily involve multiple cases or contro-
versies, each of which must have an independent jurisdictional
basis, or does the mere fact that they are joined together in a single
lawsuit mean that they constitute only a single case or controversy?
Both of these questions must be answered in the negative; whether
the claims constitute single or multiple controversies is not depen-
dent upon whether procedural rules permit their joinder in a single
lawsuit but in every instance must be determined by examining the
relationship which exists among the various claims.53
Some guidance for resolution of the case or controversy problem
can be found in Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's statement that
[w]hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union
is extended by the Constitution, forms an ingredient of the
original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the
Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other
questions of fact or of law may be involved in it. 4
While it might appear that the foregoing language refers only to the
situation in which a single claim involves questions which are not
within any of the nine Article III categories along with questions to
which the constitutional grant does extend, more recent Supreme
Court decisions leave no doubt that the underlying principle is
broader than this and that multiple claims may be so related as to
constitute a single case or controversy.?5 In this event, the federal
court does not exceed constitutional limitations by adjudicating
the court acquires diversity jurisdiction, not the claimants themselves. If the claim is asserted
by a proper representative, the citizenship of the represented person is irrelevant to the
subject matter jurisdiction issue.
53. See. e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Hoffman v.
McClelland, 264 U.S. 552, 558 (1924); Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 113 (1904);
Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 284 (1884); Dunn v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1, 3 (1834).
54. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 821 (1824).
55. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Hurn v. Ousler, 289 U.S.
238 (1933).
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even those claims which would not have been cognizable in federal
court had they been presented alone, " provided the case contains
at least one claim which fits within the Article III categories."7
It is clear, then, that multiple claims do not necessarily consti-
tute multiple cases or controversies, and it should be equally clear
that multiple cases or controversies do not lose their identity as such
merely because they are joined together in a single civil action. If
they did, federal court jurisdiction would be limited not by the
constitutional case or controversy requirement but solely by the
rules of procedure governing joinder of claims, and federal court
subject matter jurisdiction therefore could be expanded or con-
tracted by the simple expedient of amending the rules which govern
joinder procedures.
Pendent jurisdiction. In order to avoid exceeding constitutional
limitations, multiple-claim suits usually must be examined to de-
termine whether the asserted claims are all part of a single case or
controversy or whether they are in fact separate controversies which
have been joined together in a single lawsuit and which therefore
must each have an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction.
Such an analysis is unnecessary when a single plaintiff invokes the
court's diversity jurisdiction, for if one of plaintiff's claims meets the
diversity of citizenship requirement, they will all do so.18 Further-
more, since the statutory amount-in-controversy requirement is met
if the total value of the claims asserted by the plaintiff is in excess
of $10,000, '5 each of the claims will have an independent basis of
jurisdiction if any one of them does. But if jurisdiction is predicated
upon any other jurisdictional statute, the plaintiff's several claims
must be analyzed to determine whether each must have an indepen-
dent jurisdictional basis. For example, the mere fact that plaintiff
has one claim against a nondiverse defendant which raises a federal
question does not give the federal court subject matter jurisdiction
over unrelated state claims which plaintiff has against that same
defendant,"' even though there is a procedural device for joining
56. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824).
57. Id.
58. Since in these circumstances the adverse parties are identical with respect to each
claim, the conclusion in the text is inescapable.
59. E.g., Lemmon v. Cedar Point, Inc. 406 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir. 1969); 1 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.97 [I1, at 882 (2d ed. 1972).
60. Delman v. Federal Prods. Corp., 251 F.2d 123, 126 (Ist Cir. 1958); Eisenmann V.
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such claims."' However, if the several claims "derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact . . . and . . . are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding," 2
the claims constitute a single case or controversy. If any one of the
claims satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisites, there is no constitu-
tional impediment to adjudication of all in a single lawsuit in the
federal court.": Thus a plaintiff who has invoked the court's primary
jurisdiction under an appropriate jurisdictional statute is permitted
to invoke the court's pendent jurisdiction for the adjudication of all
other claims he has against the same defendant, provided the claims
fbr which pendent jurisdiction is asserted have a common nucleus
of operative fact with the primary claim. "
Ancillary jurisdiction. When a federal court plaintiff has pro-
perly invoked the court's subject matter jurisdiction for the adjudi-
cation of his own claims, separate claims which are asserted by
individuals other than the plaintiff himself, but which are inciden-
tal or supplementary to the plaintiff's claim, are within the court's
ancillary jurisdiction.15 For example, both counterclaims and
crossclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the
subject matter of the original action, and claims relating to property
over which the court has jurisdiction, have been held to be within
the court's ancillary jurisdiction because they are incidental to the
main action. " Furthermore, intervention by other persons to assert
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence is permitted
under the ancillary jurisdiction if the intervenor's rights may be
impaired by adjudication of the main controversy. 7 So long as the
main claim is one over which the court has subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate an incidental claim
Could-National Batteries, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 862, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
'2. Un ilt~t -l*2 ?ffl2 (. IJ2J, G0 G...20 I. 1U
63. Id.
64. Id.
G-5. Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 281 (1884); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils,
Inc.. 409 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir. 1969); Silberg, Ancillary Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts,
12 J. AIR L. & CoM. 288, 292 (1941). See generall '' 41 CINCINNATI L. REv. 968 (1972).
66. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926) (counterclaim); Freeman
v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860) (property in control of federal court); R.M. Smythe &
Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 291 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1961) (cross-claim).
67. Wichita R.R. Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922); Phelps
v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886); see WRIGHT, note 3 supra, §§ 9, 75.
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either in the same proceeding " or in an ancillary proceeding." It
appears, then, that the Supreme Court has viewed the primary and
ancillary claims together as constituting a single case or controversy
within the meaning of those terms as used in Article III, for if the
ancillary claim were a separate case or controversy, then, in enter-
taining an ancillary claim which does not fall within one of the
Article III categories, the court would be entertaining a case or
controversy over which it cannot constitutionally have jurisdiction.
Obviously the federal courts do not have ancillary jurisdiction which
is not authorized by the Constitution; this would be a contradiction
in terms, since the limits of the federal judicial power are set by
Article III.' It necessarily follows that any claim which the Supreme
Court recognizes as being within the federal courts' ancillary juris-
diction implicitly is recognized as part of the same case or contro-
versy as a claim which, because it fits within one of the nine catego-
ries enumerated in Article III, is within the court's primary jurisdic-
tion.
In sum, while federal court jurisdiction cannot constitutionally
be expanded to include cases or controversies which are not author-
ized by Article III, claims which standing alone would not be within
the scope of the federal judicial power are within the pendent or
ancillary jurisdiction if they are so related to a claim which is within
the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction that taken together
the several claims constitute a single case or controversy.
The Supreme Court has never expressly defined the outer limits
of federal ancillary jurisdiction. Until recently, however, there has
been substantial unanimity among courts and commentators alike
that the mere existence of common questions of law or fact falls
short of bringing separate claims within its boundary;7' something
more is required. The recommendation that the ancillary jurisdic-
tion be expanded to include such claims72 overlooks the fact that the
federal court's ancillary jurisdiction is not something apart from its
subject matter jurisdiction, to be used to gain entrance to the fed-
68. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
69. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921); Johnson v. Chris-
tian, 125 U.S. 642 (1888); Minnesota Company v. St. Paul Company, 69 U.S. 609 (1864).
70. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
71. WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 9, at 21, § 75, at 331.
72. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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eral court when subject matter jurisdiction is lacking;" ancillary
jurisdiction is subject matter jurisdiction-limited by the Article III
case or controversy requirement-and it cannot be used to circum-
vent constitutional and statutory restrictions on the federal judicial
power if the federal courts are to continue to be the courts of limited
jurisdiction which Article III authorized the Congress to create.
Separate and independent claims having common questions of
law or fact with the main claim can be brought within the federal
court's ancillary jurisdiction only if the case or controversy require-
ment is interpreted so broadly as to make the several claims consti-
tute a single case or controversy merely because they contain com-
mon questions which predominate over individual questions.74 The
implications of such a broad interpretation would be far-reaching
indeed, expanding federal jurisdiction well beyond that which has
existed in the past and utterly frustrating the congressional intent
to limit the diversity jurisdiction which has been manifested in the
repeated raising of the amount in controversy requirement.75 Moreo-
ver, the effects of such an interpretation would not be limited to
diversity cases or to class actions; they would be felt in any situation
in which a defendant's conduct has caused harm to more than one
person, whether in the same transaction or occurrence or otherwise,
so long as the various claims contained common questions of law or
fact.
Class actions
Unquestionably the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provided for a "generally welcomed and
long-needed reform" in federal class action procedures,"6 and the
73. The ancillary jurisdiction is regarded by some as a means of avoiding jurisdictional
requirements, however. As noted in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (1972):
. . . .. a.iii y jurisdicilion was
available to solve jurisdictional problems, such as lack of diversity or amount in controversy,
which were often attendant upon utilization of joinder procedures." 469 F.2d at 1036 (Tim-
bers, J., dissenting).
74. See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 209 (1969).
75. In § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 78, the diversity jurisdiction was limited
to cases in which the amount in controversy exceeded $500. This figure was increased to $2000
in 1887, 24 Stat 552; to $3000 in 1911, 36 Stat. 1091; and to $10,000 in 1958, 72 Stat. 415.
76. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 342 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting). This view of the
1966 amendment as a welcome relief from the problems associated with the pre-1966 tripartite
classification scheme (true, hybrid and spurious) has been shared by all courts and commen-
tators who have had occasion to discuss the new rule.
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purpose of the rule concededly should not be frustrated by unduly
restrictive judicial interpretation. But as the Snyder Court pointed
out, the amount in controversy requirement which was at issue in
that case77 is a jurisdictional prerequisite and judicial interpretation
of how the amount in controversy must be computed is a matter of
statutory interpretation rather than rule interpretation.78 Similarly,
the case or controversy requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite
and the scope of a single case or controversy is a matter of constitu-
tional rather than rule interpretation.79
Snyder v. Harris0 did not address itself to the underlying case
or controversy problem which would be presented if aggregation to
satisfy the statutory requirement were permitted; since the Court
concluded that aggregation was precluded by prior interpretations
of the jurisdictional statute, it obviously was unnecessary to con-
sider what problems would have been raised by a contrary determi-
nation. The Court did point out, however, that aggregation is a
jurisdictional problem and that if aggregation of separate claims
were proper at all it would be proper in all types of lawsuits-not
just in class actions.8 ' It is in these other types of suits that the case
or controversy problem would arise most frequently.' The effect of
permitting aggregation in the Snyder-type situation, where aggrega-
tion of the named plaintiff's claim with the representative claim is
sought, would be to require the district court to determine whether
the case was an appropriate one to be maintained as a class action
before it could even consider the question of whether the subject
matter of the suit was within the court's judicial power. Once a
named plaintiff has been accepted as a proper representative of the
unnamed class members and the suit is permitted to proceed as a
class action for purposes of adjudicating the common issues, the
representative claims are-for purposes of the class action-
77. See note 7 supra.
78. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336-38 (1969). Accord, Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (1972).
79. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). But see Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers, J., dissenting).
80. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
81. Id. at :340.
82. In any case in which multiple plaintiffs unite to assert separate claims in a single
lawsuit, with one claim in excess of the jurisdictional amount and the other smaller, permit-
ting aggregation would eliminate the statutory problem, but there would be a question as to
whether the small claim was within the constitutional limits of the judicial power.
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plaintiff's claims. Moreover, with jurisdiction alleged under the
diversity statute, it should not matter whether or not plaintiff's
several claims constituted separate cases or controversies.83
It does not follow from the foregoing, however, that aggregation
would be appropriate in cases of the Snyder type, under that portion
of the aggregation doctrine which permits aggregation of claims
asserted by a single plaintiff against a single defendant.84 When a
single plaintiff files a complaint in which he seeks to recover both
for himself and on behalf of others similarly situated, he is in effect
filing an individual lawsuit for himself and is, at the same time,
asking the court to let him represent others similarly situated. If the
court does not have jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim under the
diversity, general federal question or some other jurisdictional stat-
ute, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
and the class action question is never reached. 5 Conversely, if the
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of plaintiff's lawsuit
but subsequently determines that the suit is not a proper one to be
maintained as a class action under Rule 23, s8 the complaint is not
dismissed; the action simply proceeds as plaintiff's individual law-
suit.87 Jurisdictional amount must be determined without regard to
the amounts involved in the claims of unnamed class members-not
only because of the well-established principle that jurisdiction at-
taches, if at all, at the time the complaint is filed 8 and is not
83. See notes 57 & 58 supra and accompanying text.
84. 394 U.S. at 335.
85. See, e.g., WRIGHr & MILLER, supra note 13, at 547-48.
86. See note 5 supra.
87. E.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, aff'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.
1972), aff'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973). But see WmIrr & MILLER, supra note
13, § 1759, at 574-75 (The action "may be dismissed under Rule 23(c)(1) . . . or the court
may decide to allow the litigation to go forward as an individual action .. "). The sugges-
tion that the court has discretion to dismiss the entire action if it is not an appropriate one
f aCeS ;-_-c -cus n--. . . . - cc ud a p!a-I a propei ly ii~fvvufl! LliI: cuufL's
diversity jurisdiction for determination of his own claim be deprived of his right to litigate
that claim in federal court merely because he mistakenly had believed that he could represent
those similarly situated? Indeed, Rule 23(c)(1) on its face does not permit such a conclusion.
It provides only that "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained."
[Emphasis added].
88. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cap Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938); Sun
Printing & Pub. Ass'n. v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377 (1904); 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§§ 0.98[1], [2]; 0.93 [5] (2d ed. 1972).
[Vol. 8
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1974], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol8/iss2/3
CLASS ACTION JURISDICTION
affected by events which transpire after the lawsuit is begun,89 but
also because when a suit is filed as a class action there is no assur-
ance that the unnamed class members will permit the plaintiff to
serve as their representative' or that the court's initial determina-
tion that the suit may proceed as a class action will not be altered
at some time prior to entry of final judgment."' If plaintiff's own
claims have not satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirement,
occurrence of either of the foregoing would make it quite clear that
the requisite amount in controversy had never been present and
that, even though the proceedings might be far advanced at the
time, the case is not in fact one over which the court has jurisdic-
tion.
The existence of subject matter jurisdiction consistently has
been, and should continue to be, dependent upon whether the statu-
tory requirements are met when the suit is filed-not upon the
possibility that they might be met at some future point in time.
Snyder v. Harris2 recognized that this is necessary in class actions
just as it is in other types of actions. It has nothing to do with
whether joinder of the unnamed class members would be procedur-
ally possible, or with whether the case is a proper one for mainte-
nance as a class action under Rule 23. It simply points up the fact
that in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court the plain-
tiff must have claims which meet federal jurisdiction requirements
when the suit is filed-no matter what kind of suit is filed.
Although Snyder established that in a class suit the named
plaintiffs must meet the jurisdictional requirements independently
of' the claims of those similarly situated, it did not directly answer
the question of whether the separate claims of those similarly situ-
ated must also meet the statutory requirements if the suit is to
proceed as a class action. However, it is clear at this point that the
89. See authorities cited note 86 supra.
90. Those similarly situated, who would otherwise be within the class, have an uncondi-
tional right to be excluded from the class if they so request. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). See
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 50-51
(1967).
91. Under subsection (c)(1) of Rule 23 the district court is required to make a determi-
nation as to whether the action may proceed as a class action "as soon as practicable after
commencement of the action," but such an order "may be conditional, and may be altered
or amended before the decision on the merits." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
92. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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Snyder principle requires unnamed class members to meet jurisdic-
tional requirements only if the representative nature of the claims
asserted by the plaintiff on behalf of the class members is disre-
garded and the unnamed class members are considered to the par-
ties to the litigation, making it necessary for their separate claims
to have an independent base of jurisdiction if they are to be asserted
in federal court. 3 If this were the correct approach, it would appear
that the unnamed class members would have to meet not only the
jurisdictional amount requirement of the diversity statute but also
the diversity of citizenship requirement. But it has been widely
stated that the citizenship of unnamed class members is irrelevant
even when their claims are separate and distinct rather than joint
or common, 94 and in Snyder the Court appeared to assume that this
is true.9 5 Such an assumption presupposes that the separate and
independent claims are within either the court's primary jurisdic-
tion or its ancillary jurisdiction. Since under the generally accepted
view separate claims related only in that they contain common
questions of law or fact are not within the ancillary jurisdiction,96 it
appears that the assumption set forth above was predicated on the
fact that the class claims are asserted by a representative-whose
citizenship is determinative-rather than by the class members
themselves, and the claims therefore are within the court's primary
jurisdiction.
Recognition of the representative nature of a class suit is consis-
tent with established jurisdictional principles and gives full play to
the use of the class action procedural device to settle in a single
lawsuit issues which are common to large numbers of claims. Fail-
93. In Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 130 (D. Vt. 1971), a/f'd, 469 F.2d 1033
(2d Cir. 1972), a/I'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1973), the district court, the Second
Circuit and even the United States Supreme Court, read statements contained in pre-1966
cases to the effect that each plaintiff must satisfy the jurisdictional amount require-
ment-ianguage which the Snyder Court aiso had quoted-as being directly applicable to the
question of whether unnamed class members must do so. 53 F.R.D. at 431, 469 F.2d at 1035,
42 U.S.L.W. at 4088-90.
94. See generally WRIHT, supra note 3, § 72, at 314-15.
95. As the Snyder Court phrased it:
Under current doctrine, if one member of a class is of diverse citizenship from the
class' opponent, and no nondiverse members are named parties, the suit may be
brought in federal court even though all other members of the class are citizens of
the same State as the defendant.
394 U.S. at 340. The foregoing statement was, however, dictum.
96. See authorities cited note 12 supra.
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ure to consider this characteristic of a class suit, on the other hand,
leads to the unwarranted conclusion either that the court's ancillary
jurisdiction must be expanded or that nonaggregation of claims pre-
cludes maintenance of a class action unless each class member
meets the jurisdictional amount requirement, thus depriving the
class action device of much of its efficacy in expediting the disposi-
tion of claims which contain predominant questions of law or fact.
This is what the courts did in Zahn v. International Paper Co. ," and
it is this, rather than the nonaggregation doctrine, which frustrated
use of the class action device in that case.
The Supreme Court did not hold in Zahn that a class action
may never be maintained unless all potential class members meet
the jurisdictional amount requirement; it simply affirmed the lower
courts' determinations that all who are actually included within the
class must do so. Thus the Court simply left undisturbed the district
court's determination that in the circumstances of that case it
would not be feasible to attempt to describe a class which would
include only those property owners whose claims exceeded $10,000.98
The Court's decision is an unfortunate one, however, for it ignores
the representative nature of a class suit and in so doing reaches a
result which was not required by its earlier well-reasoned decision
in Snyder v. Harris.9
At first blush it might appear that the Zahn decision will inevit-
ably result in unnecessary relitigation of those common issues which
the Zahn plaintiffs sought to litigate on behalf of themselves and
those similarly situated (i.e., if those who were potential class mem-
bers bring individual suits in the state courts of Vermont after the
Zahn case has been decided on the merits in federal court). But this
is not necessarily true. It will be true only (1) if the defendant,
International Paper Company, wins the lawsuit-in which case
those who were not represented in the prior suit can put the defen-
dant to the trouble of relitigating the whole matter, since the deci-
sion will not be res judicata with respect to such claimants and they
will not be collaterally estopped to do so because they have not had
97. 53 F.R.D. (D. Vt. 1971), aft'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4087
(U.S. Dec. 17, 1973).
98. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4088.
99. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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their day in court,'"" or (2) if International Paper loses the suit and
the Vermont courts continue to impose the mutuality requirement
as a prerequisite to application of the collateral estoppel doctrine.""
Whatever the outcome in these particular cases, however, it is
clear that, under the Zahn rationale, in jurisdictions which permit
collateral estoppel to be invoked only when the parties or their
privies were mutually bound by the earlier decision, defendants
such as International Paper Company in the Zahn case may take
advantage of each new opportunity to contest the issues-putting
each new plaintiff to the trouble of litigating all issues no matter
how many times the original defendant has lost on those issues in
prior suits.
It is equally clear that in jurisdictions which have abolished the
mutuality requirement-and there are many'02-the Zahn decision
will leave potential class members, who are excluded because of the
smallness of their claims, in the position of being able to take advan-
tage of a prior favorable decision without the concomitant disadvan-
tage of being precluded by an unfavorable one.
In sharp contrast to the foregoing, when named plaintiffs are
allowed to represent those similarly situated, both the defendant
and all potential claimants who do not opt out of the class' 3 should,
100. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze in detail the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel, it should be noted that in general res judicata bars suits
on the same claim (including all issues which were or could have been litigated therein)
between the same parties or their privies, while collateral estoppel traditionally has precluded
relitigation of issues which actually were fully and fairly litigated in, and whose resolution
was essential to the final determination of, a prior suit between the same parties or their
privies. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.9 (1965).
101. In recent years many jurisdictions have abolished the mutuality requirement. It
does not appear that the Vermont courts have taken this step as of the present writing, but
in light of the trend in that direction, the possibility of their doing so should not be dis-
counted. See, e.g., authorities cited note 102 infra.
102. E.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. :113 (1971); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 458-63 (5th Cir.
1971); Bahler v. Fletcher, 474 P.2d 329 (Ore. 1970); Schwartz v. Bronx City Public Adminis-
trator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955. 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969); Bernhard v. Bank of America
Nat'l Say. & Trust Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) provides in part that
[tihe judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to
whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not
requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
[Vol. 8
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at least in most instances, ""i be barred by the doctrine of res judicata
from relitigation, whether the prior decision was favorable or unfa-
vorable.
The implications of the Zahn decision are not restricted to cases
in which jurisdiction is predicated on the diversity statute;"" the
same undesirable and unnecessary result will obtain when federal
jurisdiction in the original suit is predicated upon the general fed-
eral question statute"" or any other statute which imposes a
minimum-amount-in-controversy requirement. Excluded class
members will never be precluded by a prior unfavorable judg-
ment,'"17 while the original defendant will, as a practical matter,
never be able to take advantage of a prior judgment in its favor"'
but may well be collaterally estopped to relitigate issues which were
determined unfavorably to it in the prior action.
CONCLUSION
Aggregation of the separate and distinct claims of multiple
claimants in order to determine the amount in controversy for juris-
dictional purposes is contrary to well-established jurisdictional
principles whether the claims are asserted in a class action or other-
wise. Enlargement of the ancillary jurisdiction for this purpose nec-
essarily would require reinterpretation of the constitutional case or
controversy requirement and would have far-reaching undesirable
effects on federal jurisdiction in general. But when a federal court
plaintiff has invoked the federal court's diversity jurisdiction for
adjudication of his own claims, and the court subsequently deter-
mines both that the named plantiff is an adequate representative
104. The res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of a particular judgment cannot be
authoritatively determined by the rendering court but must be determined by the court in
which such an effect is asserted, taking into account any due process or other problems which
might be presented by its application in a particular situation. See note 6 supra and authori-
ties cited therein.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
107. If mutuality is required for collateral estoppel, then in these circumstances the
prior decision will be irrelevant; if mutuality is not required, collateral estoppel can be
invoked, but obviously it can be invoked only against one who was a party to the suit. In the
case set out in the text, therefore, it could be invoked against the defendant but not against
the plaintiff.
108. Whether mutuality is required or not, collateral estoppel cannot be invoked
against one who was not a party or in privity with a party to the prior suit. See generally
cases cited note 102 supra.
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of those similarly situated and that the case should proceed as a
class action, the representative claims are within the court's pri-
mary subject matter jurisdiction even though some or all of the
claims of unnamed class members would not have met the require-
ments of the diversity statute if presented alone. Expansion of the
federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction to encompass such claims is
therefore not necessary to further the procedural reform contem-
plated by the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Restricting class membership to those potential claimants
whose individual claims meet the minimum amount in controversy
requirement of an applicable jurisdictional statute will result in
much unnecessary relitigation of common issues, but it should be
recognized that this was not required by the nonaggregation doc-
trine. Rather, it is the result of a failure to resolve the jurisdictional
question in class suits according to those principles which tradition-
ally have been applied to determine jurisdictional questions in rep-
resentative suits.
[Vol. 8
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